Essays On Corporate Governance by Tan, Tih Koon
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2010 
Essays On Corporate Governance 
Tih Koon Tan 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Tan, Tih Koon, "Essays On Corporate Governance" (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 
2004-2019. 4259. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4259 
 
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIH KOON TAN 
M.A. Washington State University, 2002 
M.A. Washington State University, 2001 
B.A. Washington State University, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Finance 
in the College of Business Administration 
at the University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
Summer Term 
2010 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Melissa B. Frye 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 TIH KOON TAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in 
S&P firms. 
The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the 
S&P 500 index?  Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance 
mechanisms change for these firms.  Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and 
details on how each mechanism changes.  I find that governance improves after being added to 
the index.  Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, 
the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole.  In addition, changes in 
governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. 
In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace 
him/her.  This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market 
using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive 
compensation levels.  I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) 
a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) 
a bigger tournament prize.  In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is 
strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market.  The heterogeneity index seems to 
proxy for internal labor market competition. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, etc.) have sparked 
renewed interest from researchers and investors alike.  In the first part of my dissertation, I 
examine how governance mechanisms change for firms being added to the S&P 500 index.  I 
find that governance improves after being added to the index.  Using a novel measure of 
governance improvements, I find that the market reacts positively to governance improvements.  
Also, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. 
In the second part, I examine issues related to CEO successions with another novel 
measure, competition index.  Using the competition index to capture the concentration of 
executive compensation levels, I find that a more competitive internal labor market is associated 
with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO 
turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize.  In addition, the negative performance-turnover 
relationship is strengthened by a more competitive internal labor market. 
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CHAPTER 2  
GOVERNANCE CHANGES FOR FIRMS ADDED TO THE S&P 500 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Companies to be included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index are selected 
by the Index Committee and a team of analysts and economists at Standard and Poor’s.  The 
potential companies have to distinguish themselves in order to gain membership.  Membership in 
the S&P 500 index provides a certain level of prestige to its members.  However, little is known 
about what happens after a firm is added. 
One stream of research focuses on interim performance and reports that the market reacts 
favorably to firms following index inclusion (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Beneish 
and Whaley, 2002).  Another stream of research centers on long-term performance.  They 
provide evidence of superior permanent performance post-addition (Lynch and Mendenhall, 
1997; Kaul et al., 2000; Blume and Edelen, 2001).  While prestige and “certification” can be 
used to explain the transitory price effect (Jain, 1987; Kappou et al., 2008), the justification for 
the permanent price effect is quite mixed.  Gompers et al. (2003) provide evidence on the 
governance-performance relationship.  In this study, I conjecture that changes in governance 
mechanisms following index inclusion may help explain the persistence in firm operating 
performance. 
The importance of governance has gained renewed interest in recent literature, especially 
with the outburst of corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, Global Crossing, Worldcom) and the passing 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Coates, 2007; Switzer, 2007; Chang and Sun, 2009).  Recent 
research highlights the importance of corporate governance.  In their 1997 paper, Shleifer and 
3 
 
Vishny stated that, “the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical importance.”  
In a more recent paper, Gillan (2006) re-emphasizes the importance of corporate governance.  
Klapper and Love (2004) find that governance matters, especially in countries with weak legal 
environments.  Fisman et al. (2005) show that governance plays an important role in the 
performance-dismissal relationship. 
For firms added to an index, governance structures change significantly.  Research has 
shown that institutional investors increase their holdings in firms that are being added to the 
index (Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Shankar and Miller, 2006).  A 
similar trend is found for analyst coverage as well (Liang et al., 2008; Yu, 2008).  These changes 
will likely impact current or future performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
In this study, I extend this literature by taking a more comprehensive look at how 
governance changes following additions.  Specifically, I examine eight monitoring mechanisms 
both individually and in aggregate.  The aggregate approach is designed to capture the notion 
that monitoring mechanisms may be substitutes or complements (Rediker and Seth, 1995; 
Florackis, 2005).  Thus, considering governance as a whole gives a more comprehensive picture 
of how governance changes.  Mechanisms examined in this study include the Governance Index 
(G-Index), Entrenchment Index (E-Index), institutional ownership, management ownership, 
blockholders’ ownership, duality, board size, and proportion of outsiders on a board.  I also 
create an Improvement Index, a collection of improvements in governance mechanisms, to gauge 
the overall changes in governance. 
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I find governance mechanisms improve after firms are added to the S&P 500 index.  All 
governance mechanisms (except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit 
an improvement post-addition.  To see how the market reacts in response to changes in 
governance mechanisms, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are regressed on the various 
governance mechanisms.  The results suggest that changes in institutional ownership have a 
significant impact.  In addition, I find a positive and significant coefficient for the Improvement 
Index, suggesting that the market views governance improvements as good news.  Finally, I find 
that governance improvements are positively related with operating performance improvements. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, prior research on 
governance focuses on subsets of mechanisms.  This paper acknowledges the fact that firms have 
the ability to choose among different governance mechanisms and examines a collection of 
governance mechanisms.  Using a novel measure, I offer a different perspective for examining 
governance issues.  Second, this paper provides an alternative explanation to the long-term 
performance persistence.  Third, I show that being added to the S&P 500 affects a firm’s overall 
governance structure.  Specifically, monitoring is increased, which may be consistent with the 
increased public scrutiny of firms in the index.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the 
literature review and the hypotheses.  The data and sample construction are then discussed, 
followed by a discussion of the results.  The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The S&P 500 index is considered a bellwether for the American economy and widely 
regarded as the best single gauge of the U.S. equities market (Standard and Poor’s, 2009).  In 
order to be included in this index, potential firms have to first meet seven eligibility criteria1: (1) 
domicile, (2) market capitalization of $3.5 billion or more, (3) public float of at least 50%,  (4) 
four consecutive quarters of positive as-reported earnings, (5) contribute to sector balance 
maintenance, (6) adequate liquidity and reasonable price, and (7) company type.  Then, firms 
have to be selected for inclusion by the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Index Committee, a team of 
economists from S&P and index analysts.  Hence, firms in the index as well as firms to be 
included enjoy some level of prestige.  Being selected for inclusion also conveys positive 
information about the prospects and longevity of that firm and thus provides “certification” to 
potential investors (Jain, 1987; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Kappou et al., 2008). 
Numerous studies have found positive announcement returns for firms to be included to 
an index (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Graham and Pirie, 
1994; Beneish and Whaley, 2002; Chen et al., 2004) 2 .  In addition, prior studies have 
demonstrated that firms exhibit superior long-term performance following index inclusion 
(Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Kaul et al., 2000; Blume and Edelen, 2001; Madhavan, 2003; 
Chen et al., 2004; Platikanova, 2008).  However, the explanation for this persistence is mixed.  
Chen et al. (2004) argue that the permanent price effect is due to an increase in investor 
awareness while Platikanova (2008) asserts that it is due to an improvement in earnings quality.  
                                                            
1 For details on the eligibility criteria, see the Standard and Poor’s website (http:// standardandpoors.com). 
2 Not all announcements for additions convey positive information.  Firms may be added to the index due to 
corporate restructuring such as mergers, acquisitions, etc. 
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I propose that governance structures of firms added to the index will improve, which may lead to 
long-term performance persistence. 
In terms of performance, several studies document permanent price increases following 
index inclusion (Kaul et al., 2000; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Brooks et al., 2004).  Brooks 
et al. (2004) examine the long-run performance of stocks added to the S&P 500 index.  Using 
different time intervals up to 180 trading days after inclusion, they find stock price increases and 
the prices do not reverse.  They conclude that stock performance improves for firms after index 
inclusion.  Using a simple model of demand curves for stocks, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) 
argue that since individual stocks do not have perfect substitutes, risk-averse arbitrageurs have to 
bear additional risk and thus will take trade less aggressively.  They show that mean cumulative 
abnormal returns for added stocks do not reverse within 20 trading days and their findings 
support the notion that demand curves for stocks slope downwards.  Using realized earnings per 
share (EPS), Denis et al. (2003) show that firms added to the S&P 500 index outperform peer 
firms and argue that index inclusion is not an information-free event. 
The performance improvement phenomenon is not only limited to the United States.  
Kaul et al. (2000) examine firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 index to test whether 
demand curves for stocks slope downwards.  They argue that unlike using the S&P 500, the TSE 
300 redefining event is information free and allow them to segregate the price pressure effects.  
They show that stock prices did not reverse even as trading volume returned to normal and find 
support for downward sloping demand curves for stocks. 
Studies have shown that firms encounter noticeable governance changes after being 
added to an index.  Pruitt and Wei (1989) examine actual changes in institutional holdings and 
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find that additions to the S&P 500 index are associated with increases in institutional holdings.  
Hegde and McDermott (2003) also find that institutional investors increased their holdings 
following S&P 500 index addition.  In another S&P 500 study, Chen et al. (2004) report that 
both the number of institutions and institutional holdings increase after firms are added to the 
index.  An increase in institutional holdings has also been observed in firms added to the Russell 
2000 index (Biktimirov et al., 2004) and S&P 600 index (Shankar and Miller, 2006). 
In addition, firms added were found to draw more analyst attention.  Analysts typically 
begin or increase their coverage of included firms in order to generate trading in these stocks, 
thereby creating awareness (Irvine, 2003).  Consistent with this view, Liang et al. (2008) find 
that analysts are more likely to continue or initiate coverage of a firm that has joined the S&P 
500 index. 
Previous research has focused on performance and/or some aspect of governance, either 
on institutional investors, analyst coverage, or board characteristics.  Examining executive 
compensation issues, Hartzell and Starks (2003) argue that institutional investors serve a 
monitoring role.  Schellenger et al. (1989) find a positive relationship between outside directors’ 
representation on a board and corporate performance.  In an examination of seasoned equity 
offerings, D’Mello et al. (2005) provide support for the monitoring hypothesis by demonstrating 
a positive relation between post-issue changes in institutional ownership and long-term 
performance.  Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) provide evidence showing greater institutional 
ownership is associated with higher bond ratings and lower bond yields.  While some studies 
find support, others conclude otherwise.  Using corporate takeovers as a backdrop, Duggal and 
Millar (1999) do not find evidence that institutional investors enhance efficiency in the market 
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for corporate control.  Vance (1978) finds a positive relation between inside directors and firm 
performance.  In Kesner’s (1987) paper examining Fortune 500 firms, he also shows a positive 
relation between the proportion of inside directors and returns to investor.  Furthermore, some 
papers3 find no relationship at all.  Their mixed findings are not surprising, given the fact that 
their analyses examine governance mechanisms in an isolated context.  This paper adopts a 
universal approach by examining an array of governance mechanisms and examines how the 
various governance mechanisms of S&P 500 companies have changed following their addition to 
the index.  Specifically, I examine eight different governance mechanisms, namely: institutional 
investors, G-Index, E-Index, duality, board size, board independence, management ownership, 
and blockholders’ ownership. 
For institutional ownership, a change is expected following a firm’s inclusion to an index, 
as suggested by earlier research (Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Hegde and McDermott, 2003; Chen et al., 
2004; Shankar and Miller, 2006).  In this paper, an improvement in institutional ownership is 
defined as an increase in institutional ownership, based on support from previous studies (Healy 
et al., 1999; Ajinkya et al., 2003). 
Board characteristics are another aspect of governance that I examine.  Agency theory 
suggests that it may not be in the firm’s best interest to have the CEO holding the Chairman of 
the board position (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Jensen, 1993; Pi and 
Timme, 1993; Chang and Sun, 2009).  The rationale behind is that the CEO may become too 
powerful for the board to overcome since he/she is also heading the board.  Since duality is a 
binary variable, an improvement in duality is defined as a reduction in duality. 
                                                            
3See (Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985; Kesner, Victor, and Lamont, 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Daily and 
Dalton, 1992).  
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As for board size, larger boards are less effective, as evidenced by Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993).  Furthermore, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) provide 
evidence that smaller boards are associated with higher firm value.  For this reason, board size is 
expected to decrease.  However, when large institutions increase their holdings in a firm, they 
may want to secure a board seat, thereby increasing the board size.  I follow Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993), and define an improvement in board size as a reduction in board size. 
Prior studies provide evidence on the favorable impact of outside directors to influence 
firm decisions aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth.  Beasley (1996) documents a negative 
relationship between outside directors and likelihood of financial fraud.  Fama and Jensen (1983) 
indicate that outside directors, by providing expertise and monitoring services, add value to firms.  
Examining the fraction of the board made up of non-officers, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) report 
that firms with effective governance mechanisms are rewarded with superior bond ratings and 
lower yields.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) provide evidence on the potential benefit of having 
an outsider on a board by showing that the appointment of an outside director is accompanied by 
significantly positively excess returns.  Thus, an improvement in the proportion of outside 
directors is defined as an increase in the proportion of outside directors on a board. 
Some studies have focused on the monitoring function of blockholders.  Park and Song 
(1995) compare the year-end performance between block firms and non-block firms and find that 
block firms outperform non-block firms.  They attribute the performance difference to possible 
monitoring by the blockholders.  Shome and Singh (1995) examine the relationship between firm 
value and blockholdings and find that the market reaction to announcement of block formations 
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is positive.  Hence, an improvement in blockholders’ ownership is defined as an increase in 
blockholders’ ownership. 
While some focused on blockholders, others focused on management.  In their seminal 
paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) lay the foundation for future work on agency issues.  Using a 
theoretical model, they show that a manager who owns 100 percent of the residual claims on a 
firm will make decisions which maximize his utility and agency costs will be generated when the 
owner-manager sells off a portion of his/her residual claims.  Building on Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) work, Ang et al. (2000) find that agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s 
ownership share, providing support to the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Similar to blockholders’ ownership, an improvement in management ownership is defined as an 
increase in management ownership. 
In addition to examining individual mechanisms, some studies suggest that mechanisms 
may be interrelated.  Using young IPO firms, Berry et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
governance mechanisms may work positively to reduce the agency costs that arises from the 
decrease of managerial ownership.  In a U.K. study, Florackis (2005) demonstrate that 
managerial ownership and managerial compensation work as substitute mechanisms in 
mitigating agency issues.  Examining multiple control mechanisms, Rediker and Seth (1995) also 
provide evidence supporting the substitution hypothesis.  In another U.K. study, Nikoskelainen 
and Wright (2007) find that a balance of interrelated governance mechanisms is critical for value 
increase in buyouts.  Using a large sample of firms, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) provide 
empirical evidence of interdependence among various governance mechanisms.  Hence, I 
combine the mechanisms to examine the aggregate effect. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
Firms to be added to the S&P 500 index are identified from the Standard and Poor’s 
website.  To ensure accuracy, firms are then verified through the Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, ProQuest, and PR Newswire.  The sample period 
begins in 1994, which is the starting date for company filings at the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and ends in 2007.  This process yields an initial sample of 427 firms. 
Additional restrictions are imposed which reduce the sample size.  Not all index additions 
convey valuable information for the current study.  Firms that are added to the index due to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), corporate restructuring and/or name changes were excluded 
from the sample, reducing the sample size to 393.  In addition, in order to calculate the excess 
returns for each firm, closing price information must be available from 2 days prior to and 2 days 
after the announcement date.  Also, to be able to estimate the change in institutional ownership, 
information on institutional ownership must be available for 2 quarters prior and 2 quarters after 
the announcement date.  Firms with missing information are excluded.  The final sample 
includes 347 firms (See Table 2-1). 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are used to measure the market reaction.  Stock 
price information is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  A firm’s 
cumulative return (CRTN) is calculated as the sum of the firm’s holding period return over the 2-
day period.  In this study, three indices are used to proxy for the market, namely the S&P 500 
index, the CRSP Value-Weighted index, and the CRSP Equal-Weighted index.  Market 
cumulative return (CMKTRTN) is calculated as the sum of the market’s holding period return 
12 
 
over the same 2-day period.  For robustness, I calculate CARs using two event windows, (0,2) 
and (-1,1).  The CARs over a 2-day window are calculated as the difference between the firm’s 
cumulative return and the market’s cumulative return over a 2-day window, as shown below: 
titi CMKTRTNCRTNCAR −=       (1) 
Studies have shown that firms being added to an index exhibit positive announcement 
period abnormal returns (Graham and Pirie, 1994; Beneish and Whaley, 2002).  As shown in 
Table 2-2, the sample CAR over the (0,2) window averages about 4.3%, with p-values less than 
0.01.  The CRSP Equal-Weighted Index and CRSP Value-Weighted Index are also used as 
market indices to make sure the results are not driven by the choice of the market indices.  The 
abnormal return results relative to the CRSP Equal-Weighted and Value-Weighted indices are 
qualitatively similar to those of the S&P 500. 
Institutional ownership (I.O.) is defined as the ratio of total shares owned by all 
institutions to the total shares outstanding (T.S.O.).  Quarterly institutional holdings data and 
total shares outstanding are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional Investors’ (13-F) 
database and Standard and Poor’s Compustat (COMPUSTAT) database, respectively.  The 
change in institutional ownership (ΔI.O.) in response to addition to the S&P 500 index is 
calculated as the difference between institutional ownership in the quarter before and the quarter 
after the announcement quarter: 
1
1
1
1
......
..
−
−
+
+ −=Δ
q
q
q
q
OST
stitutionssOwnedByInTotalShare
OST
stitutionssOwnedByInTotalShare
OI  (2) 
Since institutional ownership data are only available quarterly, the institutional ownership before 
and after each quarter are used to allow more time for changes to materialize.  For example, the 
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announcement that Maxim Integrated Products was to be included in the S&P 500 index was 
made on May 2, 2000.  In this case, the post-institutional ownership information and pre-
institutional ownership information are obtained from the quarter ending September 30, 2000 
and March 31, 2000, respectively.  For completeness, I also calculate change in institutional 
ownership using two quarters before and two quarters after the announcement quarter.  The 
results are qualitatively similar. 
Another aspect of governance I examine is board characteristics.  Specifically, I look at 
board size, proportion of outside directors on a board, and duality.  Board size is the number of 
directors on a corporate board.  To calculate the change in board size, I obtain the board size in 
the year before the inclusion and the board size in the year after the inclusion and take the 
difference.  The proportion of outside directors on a board is the fraction of outside/independent 
directors as a percentage of the board size.  Directors are classified as independent/outsiders if 
they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial business relations with the firm, are 
not related to employees, or are not former employees.  For the change in the proportion of 
outside directors on a board, I obtain the proportion of outside directors on a board from prior the 
inclusion and post-inclusion and subtract the prior from the post.  Duality is defined as a firm 
having the same person holding the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board 
(Chair) positions.  Duality takes the value 1 if the same person holds the CEO/Chair posts, and 
zero otherwise.  To see the change in duality, I examine the duality situation pre- and post-
addition and take the difference between them.  Data on board-related information were hand-
collected from proxy statements, available in EDGAR. 
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Management ownership is defined as the total shareholdings of all senior management 
and directors and is obtained from the proxy statements.  To calculate the change in management 
ownership, I take the difference between the pre- and post-inclusion management ownership.  
Blockholders are individuals or institutions which hold a substantial stake in a corporation.  A 
blockholder is defined as an individual or institution holding at least 5% of the firm’s total 
outstanding shares and blockholder ownership is defined as the ratio of sum of all shares owned 
by all blockholders to the total shares outstanding.  Information on blockholders’ holdings is 
obtained from proxy statements.  To measure the change in blockholders’ ownership, I subtract 
the pre-addition blockholders’ ownership from the post-addition blockholders’ ownership. 
The G-Index, adopted from Gompers et al. (2003), tracks 24 unique provisions covered 
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), covering areas such as charter, bylaws, 
takeover laws, state laws, etc.  The E-Index, adopted from Bebchuk et al. (2004), is based on 6 of 
the 24 provisions tracked by the G-Index and attempts to capture the extent to which 
shareholders can impose their will on management.  Both indexes are derived using a similar 
method: one point is added for every provision that restricts shareholder rights, i.e., a lower score 
implies stronger shareholder rights.  To see the change in G-Index and E-Index after the firm’s 
inclusion to the S&P 500 Index, I take the difference between the G-Index/E-Index values pre- 
and post-addition to the index.  For example, S&P announced on May 25, 2000, that Agilent 
Technologies will be added to the S&P 500 index.  In this case, I would take the G-Index in 1998 
(pre-addition) and 2002 (post-addition) to calculate the difference.  Note that information on the 
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G-Index and E-Index are not available every year.  Data on the G-Index and the E-Index are 
obtained from Andrew Metrick’s4 and Lucian Bebchuk’s5 websites, respectively. 
To measure the overall governance effect, I construct an Improvement Index (IIndex).  
For each governance mechanism, I compare the pre- and post-addition values and determine 
whether it has improved or not.  I then identify the governance mechanisms which improved 
after the inclusion and add 1 for each improvement to the IIndex.  Hence, the IIndex is simply 
the sum of all improved mechanisms, ranging from zero to eight.  An improvement is defined as 
(1) a decrease in the G-Index, (2) a decrease in the E-Index, (3) a decrease in duality, (4) a 
decrease in the board size, (5) an increase in the proportion of outside directors on a board, (6) an 
increase in institutional ownership, (7) an increase in management ownership, and (8) an 
increase in blockholders’ ownership. 
The control variables used are firm size, prior performance, growth opportunities, and 
debt level.  It is been widely accepted that smaller firms outperformed larger firms, commonly 
referred to as the “Small Firm Effect” (Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983; Fama and French, 1992; Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann, 2000).  Total assets are commonly used as a proxy for firm size6 and I 
use the natural logarithm of total assets in the analysis.  I control for prior performance using 
industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) for the prior year.  Firms which perform well tend to 
have better governance characteristics.  As noted by Gompers et al. (2003), there is a positive 
relationship between firm performance and governance.  Firms are classified into industries 
based on their 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Industry-adjusted ROA is 
                                                            
4 http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html 
5 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml 
6 See Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Campello (2006), etc. 
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the firm’s ROA in excess of the median firm’s ROA in that same 2-digit SIC industry.  ROA is 
calculated as net income divided by total assets.  Tobin’s Q is used to control for growth 
opportunities.  A firm’s growth opportunities are likely to impact its board composition, as 
evidenced by Smith and Watts (1992) and Lehn et al. (2003).  Tobin’s Q is calculated using 
Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) methodology.  Their approximate q is defined as: 
TA
DEBTPSMVEQsTobin )(_' ++= , where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the 
number of common shares outstanding; PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding 
preferred stock; DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets, 
plus the firm’s long-term debt; TA is the total assets of the firm.  Finally, I control for leverage.  
Financial leverage provides information on how much long-term debt a firm has.  The level of 
debt a firm has should have an impact on the firm’s future cash flows and the market’s 
expectation should account for that (Campello, 2006; George and Hwang, 2010).  Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  Variables used to obtain and calculate the control 
variables are obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Table 2-3 shows the summary statistics for the sample.  A typical corporate board of 
firms added to the S&P 500 consists of about 9 members (median), of which around two-thirds 
are independent directors.  On average, blockholders hold about one-fifth of total shares 
outstanding while insiders own approximately 6.3% of total outstanding shares.  The mean 
(median) G-Index and E-Index for the sample is 8.89 (9.00) and 2.48 (3.00), respectively.  More 
than 70% of the sample firms have one person serving both the CEO and Chair posts.  
Institutional investors own approximately two-thirds of total shares outstanding.  The average 
number of governance “improvements”, as shown in the IIndex, is around 3, with a maximum of 
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7.  Sales for the sample average about $1.26 billion, with maximum reaching $13.6 billion.  
Market capitalization for the average firm in the sample is $9.64 billion.  This result is not 
surprising, considering that the S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap segment of the U.S. equities 
market.  On average, a firm has about 16.8% of long-term debt.  Industry-adjusted ROA and 
Tobin’s Q average at around 1.5% and 2.679, respectively.  A typical firm in the sample is 
outperforming its industry peers. 
 
2.4 Results and Discussions 
To see whether there is an improvement in governance mechanisms after being added to 
the S&P 500 index, I compare each mechanism before and after the addition using paired t-tests.  
The results are summarized in Table 2-4.  The sample shows evidence of an improvement in the 
G-index, E-Index, and Duality, as denoted by a decrease in the variables.  However, only Duality 
is statistically significant (p-value = 0.063).  Institutional presence increased over the event, 
averaging 4.2%, and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.000).  This result reaffirms the 
findings by Pruitt and Wei (1989) and Biktimirov et al. (2004).  The sample exhibits a decrease 
in board size, interpreted as an improvement.  However, the decrease is not statistically 
significant.  The proportion of outside directors shows sign of improvement, with an average 
increase of about 1.1%, and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.067).    Management 
ownership and blockholders’ ownership both increased after being added to the index, but the 
increases are not statistically significant.  The results from the paired t-tests are not conclusive; 
only 3 of the 8 governance mechanisms show improvement following inclusion to the S&P 500 
index. 
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To further investigate whether the governance mechanisms have improved, I examine 
each mechanism in greater detail.  The G-Index, E-Index, and board-related mechanisms for 
quite a number of firms in the sample exhibit no change.  For example, 282 out of 347 firms 
show no change in duality; there are 240 and 205 firms with no change in the E-Index and the G-
Index, respectively.  I performed a one-sample test of proportions on each mechanism.  For each 
mechanism, I compare the firms which improved to those which deteriorated, excluding the 
firms with no improvement/deterioration.  Table 2-5 summarizes the results.  With the exception 
of management ownership and blockholders’ ownership, all other mechanisms show evidence of 
statistically significant improvements.  Approximately 66% of the firms exhibit improvements in 
institutional ownership (p-value = 0.000).  Similar pattern can be found on the indexes as well, 
with 62% and 63.6% of the firms showing improvements in G-Index and E-Index, respectively.  
Improvements on both indexes are significant.  Improvement in duality can be found in 61.5% of 
the firms.  Firms in the sample also exhibit improvements in board size and the proportion of 
outside directors.  Both reported statistically significant improvements at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  In addition, t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are 
conducted on the IIndex.  The results from both tests are summarized in Table 2-6.  Panel A 
shows that the average IIndex is approximately 3, meaning that on average, each firm exhibits 3 
governance improvements.  The results from both tests conclude that the (1) mean and (2) 
median of the IIndex are statistically (at 1% levels) and significantly different from zero.  The 
overall results from Table 2-5 suggest that improvements in governance after index inclusion are 
quite widespread. 
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To see whether the market reacts to changes in governance mechanisms, the following 
equation was estimated: 
iii
iiiiiii
CONTROLSBOWNMOWN
DualityOUTNDIREIGIIOCAR
εψββ
ββββββα
++Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=
*
%
87
654321   (3) 
where ΔIO is the change of institutional ownership, ΔGI is the change in the G-Index, ΔEI is the 
change in the E-Index, ΔNDIR is board size, Δ%OUT is the percentage of the board members 
who are outsiders, ΔMOWN is management ownership, ΔBOWN is the combined holdings of all 
blockholders.  The control variables include proxies for firm size, prior profitability, growth 
opportunities, and leverage. 
The regression results are presented in Table 2-7.  Only the change in institutional 
ownership is statistically significant.  The positive coefficient for institutional ownership 
suggests that the market reacts positively to an increase in the change in institutional ownership.  
All the other governance variables are not statistically significant.  To see if governance 
mechanisms work in cohesion (rather than in isolation), the following equation was estimated: 
iii CONTROLSIIndexCAR εψβα +++= *1       (4) 
where IIndex is the improvement index.  I utilize the same control variables.  The results are 
summarized in Table 2-8.  As expected, the market reacts positively to governance 
improvements.  A one unit increase in the IIndex is associated with a 0.61% increase in CARs.  
To make sure this result is not driven by institutional ownership, I modify the IIndex to exclude 
improvements in institutional ownership and re-run the regression.  As shown in model (2), the 
coefficient for IIndex is still positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.043). 
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The results from Table 2-8 suggest that improvements in governance are viewed as good 
news by the market.  To see whether operating performance improvement is associated with 
governance mechanisms improvements, I estimate the following equation: 
iii
iiiiiii
CONTROLSBOWNMOWN
DualityOUTNDIREIGIIOROA
εψββ
ββββββα
++Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ
*
%
87
654321  (5) 
where ΔROA is the difference between ROA of two years.  For example, ROA1-3 is the ROA 
difference between Years (t+1) and (t+3).  All other variables are as defined earlier.  The results 
are summarized in Table 2-9.  In three of the four specifications, the change in duality is negative 
and statistically significant.  As expected, the separation of the CEO/Chair position is associated 
with performance improvement.  In specification (2), a decrease in the board size is significantly 
associated with an improvement in operating performance, consistent with Jensen (1993) and 
Yermack (1996).  The coefficient for management ownership is positive and also statistically 
significant. 
As discussed earlier, there could be some inter-dependencies among governance 
mechanisms.  To see whether they work together to impact operating performance, I estimate the 
following equation: 
iii CONTROLSIIndexROA εψβα +++=Δ *1       (6) 
The regression results are presented in Table 2-10.  In all four specifications, the 
coefficient for the IIndex is positive and statistically significant.  An improvement in governance 
is associated with an improvement in operating performance.  This result suggests that 
governance mechanisms could be working in cohesion rather than in isolation, which could 
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reconcile some of the inconclusive results from previous studies7.  Governance mechanisms 
should not be looked upon separately, but rather as a combined effort. 
In summary, I have shown that firm governance improves after being included into the 
S&P 500 index.  The market reacts positively to governance improvements.  Also, improvement 
in firm performance is positively related with governance improvements. 
 
2.5 Robustness of Results 
To make sure the results were not driven by a particular choice of variables, I conduct 
additional tests on the CARs, the market indices, the proxy for firm size, and the constituents of 
the IIndex. 
For the CARs, besides the (0,2) window, I also calculate the CARs for the (-1,1) window.  
The results are qualitatively similar to the (0,2) window.  In addition, two other market indices 
(CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP equal-weighted index) are used to calculate the CARs. 
In this paper, the proxy used to control for firm size is total assets.  Others have used 
either sales (Kaul et al., 2000) or market capitalization (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Madhavan, 
2003; Yu, 2008). 
Two components of the IIndex, the G-index and E-index, are highly correlated 
(correlation coefficient > 0.60), and are potentially capturing the same thing.  To make sure the 
results are not biased due to this relation, I perform additional analyses by (1) excluding E-Index 
and (2) by excluding G-index in the IIndex computation.  All results are qualitatively similar 
regardless of variables/proxies used and are summarized in Table 2-11. 
                                                            
7 See Boyd (1995), Baliga et al. (1996), Bhagat and Black (1999), Duggal and Millar (1999), Vafeas (2000), Park 
and Shin (2004), Jennings (2005), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Rose (2007), etc. 
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
I examine what happens to the governance structures of firms added to the S&P 500 
index.  With a sample of 347 firms, I compare the pre- and post-addition governance 
mechanisms.  I find that firm governance in general improves after being added to the index.  In 
particular, duality, the proportion of outside directors, and institutional ownership show 
improvements.  Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that many mechanisms do not 
change over the sample period.  Using a one-sample proportions test, I find that all mechanisms 
(except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit statistically significant 
improvements.  This is reinforced by the fact that a typical firm exhibits 3 (median) governance 
improvements post-addition. 
To see whether the market reacts to an improvement in governance, I conduct additional 
analyses.  My results show that the market reacts positively to an increase in institutional 
ownership.  Using governance improvements in aggregate, the relationship between the market 
reaction and IIndex is positive and significant.  Hence, I conclude that the market reacts 
positively to governance improvements. 
I also test the relationship between governance improvements and operating firm 
performance.  I find that improvements in governance are positively related to operating 
performance improvement. 
In summary, the results support the notion that for firms added to the S&P 500 index, 
governance shows improvement and that this improvement leads to better operating performance.  
Also, the impact of governance should be analyzed collectively. 
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Table 2-1 Final Sample Selection 
Firms are initially identified and verified through Standard and Poor’s, Wall Street 
Journal, ProQuest, and PR Newswire, yielding 427 firms.  34 more firms are excluded 
due to mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and/or name changes.  Some 
institutional ownership data were missing from the 13-Fs.  As such, 25 more firms were 
excluded.  An additional 11 firms were excluded due to missing data from CRSP.  
Another 5 firms were excluded due to missing data from COMPUSTAT.  Board 
information not available from IRRC was obtained from proxy statements.  5 firms could 
not be verified and were dropped.  The remaining 347 firms were used as the sample for 
this study. 
 
 
       Number of Firms 
Initial Sample       427 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Corporate Restructuring, and/or    34 
Name Changes 
 
Institutional Ownership (13-F)    25 
 
Center for Research in Security    11 
Prices (CRSP) 
 
COMPUSTAT      5 
 
Proxy Statements      5 
 
 
Final Sample       347 
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Table 2-2 Cumulative Returns 
The cumulative return is calculated as the sum of the daily return within the event 
windows, (0,2) and (-1,1).  The abnormal or excess return is simply the difference 
between the cumulative return of the sample and the cumulative return of the S&P 500.  
The sample size used in this study is 347 firms.  P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  Event Window (0,2) Event Window (-1,1) 
Sample 0.043 0.045 
S&P500 -0.001 0.000 
Difference 0.044 0.045 
(0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 2-3 Summary Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  Institutional ownership is 
the total institutional holdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding.  Blockholder ownership is the 
combined holdings of all blockholders.  Management ownership is the combined holdings of all senior 
management.  Board size is the total number of directors on a corporate board.  Percentage outsiders is 
the proportion of outside directors as a percentage of board size.  A director is classified as 
independent/outsiders if they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial business relations 
with the firms, are not related to employees, or are not former employees.  Industry-adjusted ROA is the 
difference between the firm’s ROA and the ROA of the median firm in the same industry.  Tobin’s Q is 
calculated using Chung and Pruitt (1994)’s methodology, as the sum of the market value of equity, 
preferred equity, short-term liabilities net of short-term assets, and long term debt over total assets.  
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt over total assets.  Sales is net sales revenue.  Market 
capitalization is the market value of equity.  The sample size used in this study is 347 firms. 
Variables Mean Median St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
G-Index 8.890 9 2.604 3 15 
E-Index 2.484 3 1.417 0 6 
Duality 0.706 1 0.456 0 1 
Institutional Ownership 0.655 0.683 0.213 0.022 0.987 
Blockholders’ Ownership 0.196 0.140 0.192 0 0.940 
Management Ownership 0.063 0 0.086 0 0.543 
Board Size 10.02 9 3.50 4 26 
Percentage Outsiders 0.674 0.714 0.188 0.091 0.958 
Improvement Index 3.012 3 0.075 0 7 
Industry-Adjusted ROA 0.015 0.011 0.035 -0.219 0.346 
Tobin's Q 2.679 1.782 2.556 0.075 14.913 
Leverage 0.168 0.125 0.164 0.000 0.833 
Sales ($ millions) 1,260.0 679.0 1,700.0 13,600.0 35.3 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 9,640.0 6,780.0 11,600.0 116,000.0 143.0 
            
# Observations 347 347 347 347 347 
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Table 2-4 Changes in Governance Variables before and after Being Added to the S&P 500 Index 
For every firm, each governance variable is collected pre- and post- 
being added to the S&P 500 index.  Then, the pre- and post- variables 
are paired up and their means are compared.  Sample size for this 
analysis is 347. *** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
Before Being 
Added 
After Being 
Added Diff. t-stat p-value 
  
Management Ownership 0.063 0.070 0.006 1.527 0.128 
Blockholders' Ownership 0.196 0.201 0.005 0.444 0.657 
Duality 0.706 0.663 -0.043* -1.867 0.063 
Board Size 10.023 9.931 -0.092 -0.886 0.376 
Percent Outsiders 0.663 0.674 0.011* 1.841 0.067 
G-Index 8.890 8.830 -0.061 -1.106 0.270 
E-Index 2.484 2.427 -0.058 -1.637 0.103 
Institutional Ownership 0.655 0.697 0.042*** 7.448 0.000 
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Table 2-5 Proportions Test 
For every firm, each governance variable is identified whether it has 
improved or deteriorated.  I code 1 for an improvement and 0 for 
deterioration.  I exclude variables with no improvement/deterioration.  
Then, a proportions test is conducted on each governance variable.  
Sample size ranges from 65 to 347.  ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
# Observations Mean Z-statistic p-value 
          
Improvement in Institutional Ownership 347 0.660*** 5.9588 0.000 
Improvement in Management Ownership 347 0.542 1.5568 0.120 
Improvement in Blockholders' Ownership 323 0.536 1.2798 0.201 
Improvement in Duality 65 0.615* 1.8605 0.063 
Improvement in G-Index 142 0.620*** 2.8532 0.004 
Improvement in E-Index 107 0.636*** 2.8035 0.005 
Improvement in Board Size 178 0.573* 1.9488 0.051 
Improvement in Percent Outsiders 234 0.573** 2.2226 0.026 
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Table 2-6 Additional Tests on the Improvement Index (IIndex) 
The improvement index (IIndex) is a collection of governance mechanism improvements 
over the event.  The t-test tests whether the mean is significantly different from zero; the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test tests whether the median is significantly different from zero.  
Sample size for this analysis is 347.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
Panel A: t-test 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean Standard Error P-value 
     
Improvement Index 347 3.012*** 0.0753 0.000 
     
 
Panel B: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
 
Variable # Obs. Z-Statistic P-value 
    
Improvement Index 347 16.221*** 0.000 
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Table 2-7 CAR Regression on Governance Changes 
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) associated with the 
announcement of addition into the S&P 500 Index.  The dependent variable is regressed 
on the different governance variables and the control variables.  Sample size for this 
analysis is 347.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *** denotes statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
CARs 
Constant 0.0891 
0.22 
Chg in Institutional Ownership 0.0833*** 
0.004 
Chg in Board Size 0.0002 
0.876 
Chg in Percent Outsiders 0.0192 
0.441 
Chg in G-Index -0.0042 
0.168 
Chg in E-Index 0.0003 
0.942 
Chg in Management Ownership 0.0099 
0.792 
Chg in Blockholders' Ownership 0.0191 
0.164 
Chg in Duality 0.0094 
0.156 
Growth Opportunities 0.0000 
0.989 
Firm Size -0.002 
0.507 
Prior Performance 0.013 
0.882 
Leverage -0.0127 
0.486 
    
R-Square 0.0522 
# Observations 347 
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Table 2-8 CAR Regression on Governance Improvement 
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) associated with the 
announcement of addition into the S&P 500 Index.  Sample size for this analysis is 347.  
P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
Constant 0.2047*** 0.2186*** 
0.008 0.005 
Improvement Index 0.0067*** - 
(w/Institutional Ownership) 0.002 
Improvement Index - 0.0045* 
(w/o Institutional Ownership) 0.075 
Growth Opportunities -0.0016 -0.0018 
0.341 0.281 
Firm Size -0.0077** -0.0078** 
0.019 0.018 
Prior Performance -0.0748 0.0793 
0.422 0.399 
Leverage -0.0238 -0.0253 
0.22 0.196 
      
R-Square 0.0493 0.031 
# Observations 347 347 
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Table 2-9 Performance Regression on Governance Changes 
The dependent variable is the change in ROA and is regressed on the different 
governance variables and the control variables.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
ROA (Year1-2) ROA (Year1-3) ROA (Year1-4) ROA (Year1-5) 
Constant -0.1046 -0.0508 0.0246 -0.112 
0.452 0.746 0.878 0.480 
Chg in Institutional Ownership -0.0217 0.0339 -0.0481 -0.0768 
0.760 0.681 0.571 0.376 
Chg in Board Size -0.0003 -0.0073* -0.0016 0.0022 
0.930 0.094 0.718 0.624 
Chg in Percent Outsiders 0.0653 0.0752 0.1407* 0.0949 
0.272 0.284 0.062 0.198 
Chg in G-Index -0.0117 -0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0133 
0.111 0.117 0.299 0.131 
Chg in E-Index -0.0178 -0.0096 -0.0089 -0.0186 
0.146 0.510 0.567 0.238 
Chg in Management Ownership 0.1433 0.2025** 0.1467 -0.0307 
0.104 0.050 0.181 0.776 
Chg in Blockholders' Ownership 0.0253 0.0313 0.0048 0.0187 
0.455 0.423 0.909 0.674 
Chg in Duality -0.0288* -0.0536*** -0.0294 -0.0385* 
0.091 0.007 0.157 0.057 
Growth Opportunities -0.0009 -0.001 -0.00002 0.0005 
0.538 0.528 0.990 0.746 
Firm Size 0.0038 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0022 
0.532 0.825 0.715 0.753 
Prior Performance -0.0691 -0.0129 0.0143 0.0571 
0.733 0.956 0.956 0.824 
Leverage -0.0227 -0.0747 -0.0172 0.0102 
0.622 0.170 0.759 0.854 
          
R-Square 0.0622 0.0942 0.0471 0.0663 
# Observations 294 257 237 215 
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Table 2-10 Performance Regression on Governance Improvements 
The dependent variable is the change in ROA and is regressed on the different 
governance variables and the control variables.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
ROA (Year1-2) ROA (Year1-3) ROA (Year1-4) ROA (Year1-5) 
Constant -0.1191 -0.0549 -0.0822 -0.0832 
0.478 0.773 0.672 0.684 
Improvement Index 0.0256*** 0.0349*** 0.0294*** 0.0230*** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Growth Opportunities -0.0016 -0.0020 0.0025 -0.0016 
0.65 0.627 0.544 0.723 
Firm Size 0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0021 
0.878 0.726 0.794 0.807 
Prior Performance -0.0213 0.0459 0.0225 0.1174 
0.914 0.839 0.927 0.635 
Leverage -0.0068 -0.0476 0.0115 0.0338 
0.881 0.367 0.831 0.537 
          
R-Square 0.0951 0.1378 0.103 0.0697 
# Observations 294 257 237 215 
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Table 2-11 Robustness of Results 
Panel A: Market Indices and Event Windows 
Two other market indices are used in the study to make sure 
that the results obtained are not driven by the choice of the 
market.  In addition to the (0,2) window to calculate CAR, the 
(-1,1) window is also used to calculate CAR.  Results are 
qualitatively similar regardless of market index used or event 
window used. 
 
  Event Window (0,2) Event Window (-1,1) 
Sample 0.043 0.045 
CRSP EW 0.001 0.002 
Difference 0.042 0.043 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Sample 0.043 0.045 
CRSP VW -0.001 0.000 
Difference 0.043 0.044 
(0.000) (0.000) 
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Panel B: Firm Size (1) 
Total assets are used as a proxy for firm size.  Total sales have 
also been used to control for firm size.  Results obtained are 
qualitatively similar regardless of the proxy for firm size used. 
CARs 
Constant 0.1976*** 
0.002 
Chg in Institutional Ownership 0.088*** 
0.002 
Chg in Board Size 0.0003 
0.81 
Chg in Percent Outsiders 0.0195 
0.427 
Chg in G-Index -0.0047 
0.121 
Chg in E-Index 0.0006 
0.896 
Chg in Management Ownership 0.0089 
0.81 
Chg in Blockholders' Ownership 0.194 
0.154 
Chg in Duality 0.009 
0.173 
Growth Opportunities -0.0006 
0.644 
Firm Size -0.0075** 
0.014 
Prior Performance 0.0281 
0.741 
Leverage -0.016 
0.377 
    
R-Square 0.0679 
# Observations 347 
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Panel B: Firm Size (2) 
Total assets are used as a proxy for firm size.  Total sales have 
also been used to control for firm size.  Results obtained are 
qualitatively similar regardless of the proxy for firm size used. 
 
CAR (1) CAR (2) 
Constant 0.1674*** 0.1711*** 
0.009 0.008 
Improvement Index 0.0063*** - 
(w/Institutional Ownership) 0.002 
Improvement Index - 0.0049** 
(w/o Institutional Ownership) 0.035 
Growth Opportunities -0.00006 -0.0002 
0.965 0.905 
Firm Size -0.0068** -0.0066** 
0.025 0.031 
Prior Performance 0.0311 0.0286 
0.715 0.739 
Leverage -0.0171 -0.0186 
0.343 0.308 
      
R-Square 0.0457 0.0306 
# Observations 347 347 
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Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (1) 
The G-Index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003), captures 24 
provisions that restrict shareholder rights.  Bebchuk et al. (2004) argue 
that 6 specific provisions8 contribute to the explanatory power of the 
G-Index.  Results obtained are qualitatively similar regardless of 
whether the E-Index was excluded or the G-Index was excluded. 
CAR (1) CAR (2) 
Constant 0.2033*** 0.2025*** 
0.009 0.009 
Improvement Index 0.0066*** - 
(w/o E-Index) 0.006 
Improvement Index - 0.008*** 
(w/o G-Index) 0.001 
Growth Opportunities -0.0017 -0.0015 
0.308 0.359 
Firm Size -0.0075** -0.0077** 
0.022 0.019 
Prior Performance -0.0722 -0.0763 
0.44 0.411 
Leverage -0.0235 -0.022 
0.227 0.254 
      
R-Square 0.0438 0.0535 
# Observations 347 347 
      
*** and ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 The provisions are poison pills, golden parachutes, staggered boards, limits to shareholder by-law amendments, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments. 
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Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (2) 
The analysis is performed using the IIndex (excluding the G-Index).  
Results obtained are qualitatively similar. 
ROA (Year1-2) ROA (Year1-3) ROA (Year1-4) ROA (Year1-5) 
Constant -0.1091 -0.0569 -0.0806 -0.0799 
0.523 0.769 0.682 0.699 
Improvement Index 0.0231*** 0.0346*** 0.0276*** 0.0211*** 
(w/o G-Index) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Growth Opportunities -0.0019 -0.0021 0.0023 -0.0017 
0.612 0.621 0.579 0.706 
Firm Size 0.0012 -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.0018 
0.863 0.77 0.833 0.837 
Prior Performance -0.0375 0.0400 0.0398 0.1231 
0.851 0.861 0.873 0.623 
Leverage -0.0024 -0.0359 0.0231 0.0387 
0.958 0.503 0.673 0.485 
          
R-Square 0.0669 0.1141 0.0766 0.0496 
# Observations 294 257 237 215 
          
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (3) 
The analysis is performed using the IIndex (excluding the E-Index).  
Results obtained are qualitatively similar. 
ROA (Year1-2) ROA (Year1-3) ROA (Year1-4) ROA (Year1-5) 
Constant -0.1429 -0.076 -0.1089 -0.0996 
0.397 0.692 0.576 0.628 
Improvement Index 0.0279*** 0.0365*** 0.0311*** 0.0234*** 
(w/o E-Index) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Growth Opportunities -0.0018 -0.0025 0.0022 -0.0019 
0.61 0.547 0.598 0.674 
Firm Size 0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0012 
0.769 0.829 0.909 0.888 
Prior Performance -0.006 0.0562 0.0581 0.1372 
0.976 0.805 0.813 0.581 
Leverage -0.0051 -0.0494 0.0113 0.0306 
0.91 0.351 0.835 0.577 
          
R-Square 0.0931 0.1297 0.0988 0.0631 
# Observations 294 257 237 215 
          
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INTERNAL LABOR MARKET HOMOGENEITY AND CEO 
SUCCESSION ISSUES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chief Executive Officers (CEO) turnover draws a great deal of attention in organizational 
research (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  One stream of research focuses on executive succession, in 
particular, the rationale behind internal versus external successions (Parrino, 1997; Farrell and 
Whidbee, 2003; Helfat and Bailey, 2005; Martins and Lima, 2006; Xuan, 2009).  While a firm 
can promote an internal candidate or hire someone from outside, succession decisions are always 
difficult.  For example, in the case of General Electric (GE), the retirement of its CEO and 
Chairman, John Welch, sparked quite a debate.  The GE board of directors was evaluating who 
should take over Mr. Welch’s position.  The top three candidates were all on GE’s payroll; 
however none of them seemed to be the clear favorite.  Ultimately, the board picked Jeffrey 
Immelt, head of GE’s medical imaging division.  When contemplating, the board had to manage 
the expectations and disappointment of other GE executives.  The other two finalists, James 
McNerney and Robert Nardelli, eventually left GE.  This case shows that corporate successions 
have to be managed properly.  Otherwise, it may cause chaos and resentment. 
Prior studies have noticed differences between internal and external CEO successions 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994, Chan, 1996; Agrawal et al., 2006).  Chan (1996) reports that among 
the 84 CEOs of the Fortune 100 firms who were promoted to the position since 1984, only 11 
were recruited from outside the organization.  Agrawal et al. (2006) also document that more 
than 80% of CEO successions in large U.S. firms involve the promotion of an insider.  These 
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studies suggest that most companies give preference to the internal candidate in a CEO 
succession decision. 
There are alternative viewpoints behind the favoritism towards internal candidates.  
Human capital theories suggest internal candidates usually possess firm-specific knowledge and 
relationships.  Their ability can be observed with less noise; and less recruitment and training 
costs are needed when promoting from inside (Chan, 1996).  However, in many cases, candidates’ 
experience and ability are not easily measurable or comparable.  In fact, Agrawal et al. (2006) 
rule out the possibility that experienced candidates are more favored in CEO successions. 
An alternative explanation for why firms prefer internal over external candidates is based 
on tournament theory.  Initially used in labor economics and widely applied in sports economics, 
tournament theory was introduced into the corporate context by Lazear and Rosen (1981).  
Tournament theory is distinct from other incentive devices (e.g., human capital) in that it focuses 
on relative performance and pay among the executives rather than those of individual executives 
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Bull et al., 1987; Eriksson, 1999).  In corporate tournaments, 
competition is viewed as an incentive device with which agents compete for the fixed prizes 
according to their relative performance (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003).  The increased 
competition induces the executives to work hard in order to achieve the prize of becoming the 
CEO.  The larger the prize, the greater the incentive for the executives to work harder in order to 
achieve success (to become CEO).  To boost productive competition in the internal job market, 
firms give preference to internal CEO candidates and handicap external ones (Chan, 1996; 
Agrawal et al, 2006). 
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Using the compensation of executives, I develop the Heterogeneity Index (HI), in order 
to examine its relationship with CEO succession issues.  The HI measures the compensation 
concentration within each firm.  Specifically, I test whether compensation diversity among top 
executives affects (1) the likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) the likelihood of a turnover, 
and (3) the compensation change after ascending to the CEO post. 
Using firms in the S&P 1500 index from 1996 to 2006, I find a negative and significant 
relationship between compensation concentration and the likelihood of an internal replacement.  
Homogeneity in compensation among executives may induce them to work harder to win the 
tournament (i.e., CEO post) and an internal candidate will be more likely to succeed the outgoing 
CEO.  Consistent with prior studies (Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Goyal and Park, 2002; 
Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Maury, 2006; Florou and Pope, 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009; 
Chakraborty et al., 2009; Chi and Wang, 2009), I find that poor prior performance is associated 
with a greater likelihood of a turnover.  In addition, I show that this performance-turnover 
relationship is strengthened by the homogeneous nature in compensation among executives.  
Specifically, the more comparable executives’ compensation is, the more likely that poor 
performance leads to a turnover.  For internal replacements, I find that the compensation increase 
is significantly greater for firms with a homogeneous top management team (TMT).  The prize of 
winning the tournament is positively related to the homogeneous nature of compensation among 
executives. 
This study contributes to the literature in a couple of ways.  First, I develop a novel 
measure of compensation concentration.  Using executives’ compensation information, the 
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nature of the concentration within the TMT can be estimated.  Examining the implications of 
such concentration on CEO succession decisions is an important and interesting contribution.  
Second, this study provides a more observable way to anticipate CEO successions, using 
the HI I develop.  Prior research focuses on CEO successions by examining organizational 
structure and industry homogeneity (Agrawal et al., 2006) or studying firms’ succession plans 
(Naveen, 2006).  Both studies center their attention to only certain characteristics, e.g., 
comparability (Agrawal et al., 2006) or relay succession (Naveen, 2006).    Examining TMT’s 
compensation provides explicit information about the homogeneity of the executives, and thus, 
offers an interesting approach to study CEO successions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The following section reviews the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses.  The data and sample are described next, followed by a 
discussion of the results.  The next section discusses the robustness of the results.  The last 
section summarizes and provides some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Research on Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been overwhelming9.  Issues covered 
include but are not limited to turnovers, governance, performance, and compensation.  When a 
CEO leaves the company, speculation about the reason for departure and speculation about the 
potential successors arise.  One of the main reasons for CEO departure is poor firm performance 
(Parrino, 1997; Maury, 2006; Florou and Pope, 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009).  As for 
successors, the company can either engage someone from outside or promote someone from 
                                                            
9 A simple search on Google Scholar with keywords like “CEO” and “Chief Executive Officer” yields 470,000 and 
409,000 results, respectively. 
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within.  Even though research has shown that large firms prefer insiders over outsiders (Chan, 
1996; Agrawal et al., 2006), succession decisions are still very difficult.  Two articles (Lublin, 
2004; Orwall and Lublin, 2004) published in the Wall Street Journal illustrate this point.  On the 
one hand, companies announce retirements early to reduce uncertainty.  On the other hand, 
investors wonder whether a “lame duck” CEO will benefit shareholders.  In addition, company 
boards have to consider the merits of each potential candidate (both internal and external) and 
manage the expectations of other executives.  If not managed properly, the situation could turn 
for the worse, causing disorder and unpleasantness. 
Prior research has examined insider versus outsider CEO succession decisions from 
various perspectives, among which tournament theory has received a lot of recent attention.  
Tournament theory has primarily been used in labor economics and applied in sports economics.  
Built on this theory, Lazear and Rosen (1981) posit a distinct compensation scheme based on 
rank in an organization and relative performance.  While the conventional compensation 
schemes like human capital models10 and agency models11 suggest pay based on input (ability, 
experience, and efforts) or output (direct performance) of individuals, the rank-based 
compensation scheme focuses on one’s performance relative to others..  Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
believe that tournament theory induces the same efficient allocation of resources as the other 
schemes. 
Studies have examined the economic efficiency of the rank-based scheme (Green and 
Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Rosen, 1986).  They conclude that individuals’ ability, 
experience and individual performance are not always easy to measure; the rank-based 
                                                            
10 Compensation is based on education, experience, etc. (Becker, 1964). 
11 Compensation is contingent on some conditions like good performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sappington, 1991). 
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compensation scheme provides a better incentive device for executives to work harder in order to 
achieve prizes. 
Empirical evidence also supports the rank-based compensation scheme.  Using a sample 
of Danish executives, Eriksson (1999) finds that there is a stable convex relation between pay 
and job levels and that there is a positive relation between the number of “important” managers 
and the wage spread.  Bognanno (2001) shows similar results that pay rises strongly with 
hierarchical level.  In an experimental setting, Bull et al. (1987) observe large variance of effort 
level in all rank-order tournaments.  The mean effort level of disadvantaged subjects is above 
their equilibrium level.  Their results are also supportive of tournament theory. 
Recently, tournament theory has been extended to corporate tournaments among senior 
executives (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Conyon et al., 2001; Heyman, 2005; Harbring and 
Irlenbusch, 2008; Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2010).  While some studies fail 
to find support for tournament theory (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008; Shen et al., 2010), most 
studies do find some support (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Conyon et al., 2001; Heyman, 
2005; Kale et al., 2009).  Tournaments to win the CEO prize induce senior executives to work 
hard.  The competition among senior executives arises from their desire for power and career 
advancement (Shen and Cannella, 2002). 
Prior studies have used different factors to explain turnovers and successions.  Parrino 
(1997) shows that the likelihood of forced turnover increases with industry homogeneity.  He 
argues that it is easier (and less costly) for firms to recruit someone from another firm within the 
same industry since that executive possesses much of the human capital needed. 
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Agrawal et al. (2006) use comparability among insiders and comparability between 
insiders and outsiders to explain outsider handicapping choices in firms.  They propose that 
insiders are more comparable in firms with a product or line of business organizational structure, 
and these firms are more likely to choose inside candidates to succeed the CEO position.  In 
another study, Naveen (2006) argues that larger and diversified firms, being more complex in 
nature, are more likely to use relay succession.  Also, firms that do relay succession planning are 
more likely to select an internal candidate as its CEO.  Her definition of having succession plans 
is having an heir apparent.  However, the definition of having a succession plan is debatable 
and/or unclear as firms do not always announce their heir apparent publicly.  Both studies focus 
on internal successions, but only identify certain characteristics (having more comparability 
between candidates; having an heir apparent). 
While some studies have examined the pay gap 12  (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; 
Carpenter and Sanders, 2004) as a measure of CEO power (Finkelstein, 1992; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006; Shen et al., 2010), others use the pay gap as a 
proxy for tournament incentive (Heyman, 2005; Gnyawali et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2009).  
However, the pay gap only takes the compensations of two (at most three) executives into 
account and thus does not capture the overall competitive nature at the firm. 
Tournament theory focuses on relative pay among peers, which implies the importance of 
the internal labor market within each firm.  Building on this theory, I measure concentration with 
characteristics of the internal labor market using a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
                                                            
12 Pay gap is calculated as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the average TMT.  Some studies 
have defined pay gap differently, either as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the median TMT 
(Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2010), or as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the next highest 
paid executive (Mobbs and Raheja, 2010). 
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The HHI (Hirschman, 1945) is a measure of market concentration.  It is defined as the sum of the 
squares of market shares of the top firms within an industry.  A higher HHI generally indicates 
more market power, hence less competition.  Based on this modified HHI-based index, I develop 
the Heterogeneity Index (HI) using different compensation measures to estimate how diverse the 
executives are.  A high HI indicates that the compensation among the executives is more 
differentiated (heterogeneous), implying that one or more of the executives’ compensation 
dominates the others.  If executives are paid according to their ability/skill level, that 
executive(s)’ capabilities may be above the others and/or may be delegated more significant 
responsibilities than the other executives.  A low HI indicates that the compensation among 
executives is more comparable (homogeneous), which may induce productive competition 
among them and encourages them to work harder to “win” the prize – the CEO post. 
If internal labor markets are more homogeneous, the firm should be more likely to select 
an inside candidate to replace the departing CEO.  For a tournament to benefit the firm through 
harder work by executives, firms must provide a high probability that an internal candidate will 
be selected (Chan 1996).  On the one hand, if an executive’s compensation overshadows the 
others, it may dampen the other executives’ drive knowing that the goal (becoming the CEO) is 
too far-reached.  On the other hand, when compensation levels are more comparable, they may 
feel that they have a better shot of becoming the CEO if they work hard.  Following tournament 
predictions, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: The more homogeneous the internal labor markets, the greater the likelihood of an 
internal replacement. 
 
56 
 
For tournaments to be successful, aspiring executives need to perceive a greater 
likelihood of achieving the prize.  Thus, boards must be willing to replace an underperforming 
CEO (Lehn and Makhija, 1997; Dahya et al., 2002; Lausten, 2002; Brunello et al., 2003; Parrino 
et al., 2003; Hillier et al., 2005; Kato and Long, 2006; Conyon and He, 2008; Finkelstein et al., 
2009).  Using alternative measures of performance (economic value added and market value 
added) and stock return, Lehn and Makhija (1997) find a significant inverse relation between 
performance and the likelihood of CEO turnover.  Focusing on large publicly-traded firms during 
the 1982-93 period, Parrino et al. (2003) show that firms experienced poor performance prior to 
a forced CEO turnover.  The negative turnover-performance relationship persists not only in the 
United States.  Dahya et al. (2002) demonstrate a significant negative correlation between CEO 
turnover and corporate performance in U.K. firms.  Using Chinese listed firms, Kato and Long 
(2006) show that management turnover and firm performance are inversely related.  In another 
Chinese study, Conyon and He (2008) report a similar relation between CEO turnover and 
measures of firm performance.  Also, as Parrino (1997) highlights, succession costs may be 
reduced if a viable internal candidate is available, which should be facilitated by greater 
competition.  Hence, I propose the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO turnover will be more sensitive to firm performance when internal labor 
markets are more homogeneous. 
 
Larger prizes should result in more effort.  Drago and Garvey (1998) examine the 
relationship between efforts and promotion incentives and find that when promotion incentives 
are strong, individual efforts are increased.  Homogeneity among executives should induce 
greater efforts.  Hence, new internal CEOs emerging from homogeneous internal labor market 
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environments will receive larger increases in compensation relative to those emerging from 
heterogeneous environments.  O’Reilly et al. (1988) and Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) note 
that tournament theory implies the prize should increase with the number of contestants or the 
competition for the position.  Kale et al. (2009) provide empirical support for this view.  The 
authors find a positive relation between the number of vice presidents (VPs) and the pay gap (i.e., 
a proxy for the tournament prize).  Eriksson (1999) also provide support for the tournament view 
by showing a positive relationship between the number of participants and the prize of the 
tournament in Danish firms.  In a U.K. study, Conyon et al. (2001) report that the pay gap is 
positively related to the number of participants in the tournament.  Rather than using pay gap as 
an estimate for the size of the tournament prize (Conyon et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al., 
2010), I compare the compensation of those CEOs promoted internally with his compensation 
from before his promotion to obtain the actual increase in compensation.  Hence, I propose my 
third and last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The prize of the new CEO will be higher if internal labor markets are more 
homogeneous. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
CEO successions are identified using the ExecuComp database from 1996 to 2006.  
ExecuComp contains compensation and executive data for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 
400, and S&P Smallcap 600.  A CEO is defined as a person who is identified as a Chief 
Executive Officer of the firm in ExecuComp, and all other executives are classified as TMT.  
Internal versus external replacements are identified by tracking the career paths of the new CEOs.  
Executives with the firm less than one year are classified as outsiders.  Insider appointments are 
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verified through ExecuComp, proxy statements, and news articles.  Of the 1,663 turnovers 
identified, only 21% of the replacements are recruited externally.  The proportion of internal 
promotion (79%) is slightly lower than the fraction (82%) reported by Agrawal et al. (2006). 
In this study, three measures of compensation are used: (1) total compensation, (2) 
current compensation, and (3) equity-based compensation.  Total compensation (TDC) is 
calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other 
compensation.  Current compensation (SAL) is calculated as the sum of salary and bonus 
whereas equity-based compensation (EBC) is calculated as the sum of total value of restricted 
stock granted and total value of stock options granted. 
To measure internal labor market concentration, I compute the Heterogeneity Index (HI), 
which is based on the HHI, using the three measures of compensation, as follows: 
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where N is the number of top executives (excluding the CEO) at firm i and Cj is executive j’s (1) 
TDC, (2) SAL, or (3) EBC. 
The control variables used are board characteristics, pay gap, firm size, prior performance, 
and leverage.  CEO firing/hiring decisions are ultimately made by the corporate board.  Hence, I 
control for board-related characteristics.  Board characteristics used in this study include board 
size, board independence, and duality.  Board size is the number of directors on a corporate 
board.  Board independence is the proportion of outside directors on a board.  Directors are 
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classified as independent/outsiders if they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial 
business relations with the firm, are not related to employees, or are not former employees.  
Duality is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
and 0 otherwise.  Board-related variables are hand-collected from proxy statements. 
The pay gap, defined as the pay disparity between the CEO and average TMT, has been 
used in quite a few studies.  Some studies show that large pay disparity among senior executives 
has a harmful effect on the firm itself13 (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Bloom and Michel, 2002; 
Carpenter and Sanders, 2004; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005; Fredrickson et al., 2010) while 
others14 present evidence showing otherwise (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Heyman, 2005; 
Gnyawali et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2009, Kale et al., 2010).  Hence, I control for pay gap in my 
analysis.  Data on executives’ compensation is obtained from ExecuComp. 
I control for firm size because managers in larger firms are less likely to be replaced 
(Volpin, 2002; Firth et al., 2006; Chang and Wong, 2009; Wang, 2010).  I use the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size.  Prior firm performance is an important 
determinant of CEO turnover (Huson et al., 2001; Chakraborty et al., 2009; Chang and Wong, 
2009).  Hence, I control for prior performance using industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) 
for the prior year.  Firms are classified into industries based on their 2-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes.  Industry-adjusted ROA is the firm’s ROA in excess of the median 
firm’s ROA in that same 2-digit SIC industry.  ROA is calculated as net income divided by total 
assets.  Creditors play a role in disciplining managers (Jensen, 1986; Chang and Wong, 2009).  
Thus, I control for capital structure.  Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
                                                            
13 Behavioral perspective based on relative deprivation theory and/or social comparison theory. 
14 Economic perspective based on tournament theory. 
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Variables used to obtain and calculate firm size, prior firm performance, and leverage are 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Table 3-1 presents the summary statistics for the sample.  The average HIs range from 
0.2156 (current) to 0.3575 (equity-based), depending on the compensation measure utilized.  
Using compensation as an indication of individual ability, the more homogeneous the internal 
labor market, the more comparable their ability.  The HIs indicate that the internal labor market 
is quite homogeneous.  Looking at the pay disparity, the average pay gap is between $835,000 
and $3.367 million, slightly above the pay gaps reported by Kale et al. (2010).  As shown by 
Kale et al. (2010), pay gaps have increased over the years.  The discrepancy in pay gap can 
possibly be explained by the difference in sample periods between the two studies15. 
The average CEO makes $5.3 million in total compensation; his average current 
compensation and average equity-based compensation is about $1.465 million and almost $3 
million, respectively.  A typical corporate board has 9 (median) members, of which about 65% 
are independent.  In 67% of the firms, the CEO also holds the Chairman of the board position.  
Boyd (1995) and Tuggle et al. (2010) report CEO/Chair duality in 46% and 66% of their samples, 
respectively.  The proportion reported here is higher than what Boyd (1995) found.  The 
difference could be due to the sample period: Boyd’s sample covers the 1980s whereas my 
sample extends over from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s.  The average firm outperforms its 
peers, with an industry-adjusted ROA of about 4%.  On average, a firm has about 19% of long-
term debt in its capital structure. 
 
                                                            
15 The sample period covered by Kale et al. (2010) is from 1993 to 2004 whereas this paper covers the 1996-2006 
period. 
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3.4 Results and Discussions 
To test the first hypothesis on homogeneity and replacement type, I employ a logistic 
regression model to predict the likelihood of an internal (versus external) candidate being chosen 
as the new CEO.  First, I separate the sample into two groups: firm-years which experienced a 
CEO turnover and firm-years which did not experience a CEO turnover.  From the “experienced 
a CEO turnover” group, I further divide the subsample into two subgroups: internal replacement 
and external replacement.  To empirically test the first hypothesis, the following equation was 
estimated: 
iii CONTROLSHIInternal εψβα +++= *1      (1) 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the new CEO is 
promoted from within the company, and zero otherwise; HI is the heterogeneity index, control 
variables include pay gap, duality, board independence, board size, firm size, prior performance, 
and leverage. 
In addition to using the level of HI, I also include a dummy variable, SIMILAR, to capture 
the similarity of compensation within the internal labor market.  The econometric equation is as 
follows: 
iii CONTROLSSIMILARInternal εψβα +++= *1      (2) 
where SIMILAR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the HI is below the median HI, and 
zero otherwise; all other variables are as previously defined. 
Both equations are administered thrice each, based on the three measures of 
compensation.  The results are presented in Table 3-2.  As expected, the coefficients for HI are 
all negative; however the coefficient for one specification is insignificant.  A lower HI is 
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associated with a higher probability of an internal replacement.  As mentioned earlier, a lower HI 
implies homogeneity.  Hence, the more homogeneous the internal labor market, the greater the 
likelihood of an internal replacement.  The results from using SIMILAR also produce similar 
inference.  The coefficients for SIMILAR are positive and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that a 
more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with a greater likelihood of an internal 
replacement.  The results support Hypothesis 1 – the more homogeneous the internal labor 
market, the higher the probability of an internal replacement. 
A few of the control variables yield significant results.  First, the coefficients for pay gap 
are negative and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that a lower pay gap is associated with a higher 
probability of an internal replacement.  Second, the negative and significant coefficient for board 
independence indicates that the more independent the corporate board, the lower the likelihood 
of an internal replacement.  Third, the relation between duality and the probability of an internal 
replacement is negative.  Prior to the current replacement, if the CEO shares the Chairman 
position, the lower the probability of an internal candidate succeeding the CEO post.  Next, the 
coefficient for board size is positive and significant.  A larger board is associated with a higher 
probability of an internal replacement.  Finally, the positive relation between prior performance 
and the likelihood of an internal replacement indicates that if the firm is doing well prior to the 
CEO change, the new CEO is more likely to be promoted from within. 
I employ the use of a random effects logistic regression model to test the second 
hypothesis.  All firm-year observations (including those which experienced a turnover and those 
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which did not experience a turnover) are used in this analysis.  To test this hypothesis, I use the 
following equation16: 
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where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is serving in his last 
full fiscal year and zero otherwise.  The independent variables include SIMILAR, the 
contemporaneous and lagged difference between the return on firm i in year t and the market17 
return in the same period.  The control variables are as previously defined. 
The regression results from Equation (3) are summarized in Table 3-3.  The coefficients 
for SIMILAR are positive and significant, indicating that the more homogeneous the internal 
labor market, the higher the probability of a turnover.  As expected, the coefficients for the 
lagged excess returns are negative and significant.  This result is in line with what others have 
predicted (Dahya et al., 2002; Lausten, 2002). 
To see whether the second hypothesis is supported, the coefficient of interest is the 
interaction term.  In two of the three specifications, the negative and significant coefficients for 
the interaction term (Excess Returnt-1*SIMILAR) confirm that the homogeneity nature of the 
internal labor market strengthens the performance-turnover relationship.  In firms with 
homogeneous internal labor markets, the performance-turnover relationship is stronger in that the 
negative effect is larger.  Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
                                                            
16 In addition to SIMILAR, the dependent variable is also regressed on HI and other control variables.  Main results 
do not change. 
17 The Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) Index is used as the market index.  Additional tests are conducted using 
other market indices.  See “Robustness Test” section for more information. 
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For the control variables, only two of them (pay gap and duality) are statistically 
significant for all specifications.  The positive coefficient for pay gap indicates that the larger the 
pay gap between the CEO and the VPs, the greater the likelihood of turnover.  As for duality, the 
coefficient is negative, suggesting that if the CEO/Chairman position is held by one person, the 
lower the probability of turnover.  This result is consistent with the notion that a CEO holding 
the Chairman position is more powerful and entrenched and hence less likely to be fired/replaced 
(Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Tuggle et al., 2010). 
The coefficient for board independence is positive and significant (p<0.05) for two 
specifications.  This result seems to suggest that the independent directors are performing a 
monitoring role, consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003).  The 
relationship between firm size and the likelihood of turnover is positive and significant (p<0.1 
and p<0.01) for two specifications, suggesting that holding all else constant, larger firms are 
more likely to experience top management turnover. 
To test the third hypothesis, I use only the CEOs promoted from within the company for 
two reasons.  First, tracing prior compensation for external candidates is difficult because they 
could have come from non-public companies, non-US companies, etc.  Second, it is more 
straightforward to compare their compensation if they are at the same company.  As mentioned 
earlier, this procedure yields 1,315 observations.  Panel A of Table 3-4 presents the summary 
statistics.  Median total compensation increases approximately $473,000 while median equity-
based compensation increases only about $49,000. 
Using the internally promoted CEO subsample, I compare the compensation change from 
before they were promoted.   The results are presented in Panel B of Table 3-4.  The paired t-test 
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analyses show that there is a significant difference in compensation changes between the two 
groups.  In all compensation measures, the compensation change for the “homogeneous” group 
is greater than the compensation change for the “heterogeneous” group.  The differences in 
compensation changes between “homo- and hetero-” for SAL and TDC are about $217,000 and 
$1.311 million, respectively.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
In summary, I have shown that the more homogeneous the internal labor market, (1) the 
higher the probability of an internal replacement, (2) the more sensitive CEO turnover will be to 
firm performance, and (3) the higher the prize of the new CEO.  These results seem to suggest 
that HI may be a useful proxy for competition among executives. 
 
3.5 Robustness of Results 
The reported HI is based on compensation concentration among top executives, 
excluding the CEO.  Alternatively, I also include the CEO in the calculation of HI.  The 
predicted signs and significance are generally similar to the HI reported18. 
The results reported earlier are based on returns in excess of the S&P 500 index.  To 
make sure the results were not driven by the choice of the market index, I conduct additional 
tests on the market indices.  Two other market indices (CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP 
equal-weighted index) are used to calculate the excess returns to test Hypothesis 2.  Results are 
presented in Table 3-5.  In addition to using the logistic regression model to test Hypotheses 1 & 
2, I repeat all analyses using the probit regression model.  Table 3-6 presents the results.  All 
results are qualitatively similar regardless of market index or regression model used. 
                                                            
18 Results not reported. 
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Research on chief executive officers has been extensive.  One aspect of particular interest 
is CEO turnover/replacements.  Because the CEO is the head of the corporation who makes 
decisions which affect the company’s short-term as well as long-term strategies, investors and 
researchers alike have an interest on the outcome of this event. 
In this paper, I develop a Heterogeneity Index, which measures the compensation 
concentration of the internal labor market for the executives.  I propose three hypotheses and the 
results provide support for all of them.  I find that the probability of an internal replacement is 
higher in a more homogeneous internal labor market.  In addition, the increase in compensation 
is positively related to the homogeneous nature of the internal labor market. 
I also find a positive relation between the homogeneous nature of the internal labor 
market and the likelihood of a CEO turnover.  The negative relation between prior performance 
and probability of a turnover is also found.  In addition, this negative performance-turnover 
relationship is magnified by a more homogeneous internal labor market. 
The results from this study suggest that homogeneity among TMT provides an alternative 
perspective to examining CEO-related issues.  The heterogeneity index I develop can possibly be 
used as a proxy for the competition among top management.  Overall, my results provide some 
support for tournament theory. 
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  Internal 
Succession is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the new CEO is promoted from 
within the same company, and zero otherwise.  Board size is the total number of directors 
on a corporate board.  Board independence is the proportion of outside directors as a 
percentage of board size.  Duality is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO 
also holds the Chairman post, and zero otherwise.  Leverage is the ratio of long term debt 
over total assets.  Prior performance is the industry-adjusted ROA of the company for the 
previous year. Market value of equity is the market capitalization of the company (stock 
price X number of shares outstanding).  Total sample size is 14,843 firm-years.  The 
difference in sample size is due to missing data or information not available. 
 
Variables Mean Median St. Dev. # Obs. 
     
Heterogeneity Index:     
    Current Compensation 0.2156 0.2087 0.0621 14,839 
     
    Equity-Based Compensation 0.3575 0.3009 0.1763 12,580 
     
    Total Compensation 0.2708 0.2517 0.0854 14,815 
     
CEO Compensation: ($ thousands)     
    Current Compensation 1,465.33 1,000.00 1,764.17 14,843 
     
    Equity-Based Compensation 2,996.72 838.10 11,517.96 14,843 
     
    Total Compensation 5,296.29 2,604.78 12,448.39 14,759 
     
Pay Gap:($ thousands)     
    Current Compensation 835.44 532.86 1,328.45 14,843 
     
    Equity-Based Compensation 2,020.86 454.69 9,929.40 14,843 
     
    Total Compensation 3,367.19 1,445.39 10,514.34 14,843 
     
Internal Succession 0.7907 1.0000 0.4069 1,663 
     
Board Size 9.57 9.00 2.93 14,843 
     
Board Independence 0.6500 0.6700 0.1750 14,843 
     
Duality 0.6650 1.0000 0.4780 14,843 
     
Market Value of Equity ($ millions) 8.31 1.68 26.41 12,257 
     
Total Assets ($ millions) 13.69 1.76 65.63 14,760 
     
Leverage 0.1901 0.1689 0.1645 14,728 
     
Prior Performance 0.0405 0.0444 0.1253 14,760 
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Table 3-2 Logistic Regression – Internal versus External Replacement 
The dependent variables take the value 1 if the new CEO is promoted from within the 
same company, and zero otherwise.  Each dependent variable is regressed using a logit 
model on the (1) Heterogeneity Index or (2) a dummy variable, SIMILAR, and the 
various control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 SAL SAL EBC EBC TDC TDC 
       
Constant 0.5372 0.387 1.9205*** 0.4852 1.4349*** 0.5374 
 0.226 0.317 0.005 0.457 0.001 0.174 
       
Heterogeneity Index -0.3552 --- -3.5986*** --- -2.5621*** --- 
 0.748  0.000  0.000  
       
SIMILAR --- 0.151 --- 0.5241** --- 0.3419** 
  0.247  0.022  0.014 
       
Pay Gap -0.2409*** -0.2345*** 0.0774 -0.0707 -0.2158*** -0.2741*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.482 0.469 0.001 0.000 
       
Duality -0.3898*** -0.3968*** -0.2512 -0.2879 -0.3538*** -0.3663*** 
 0.003 0.002 0.218 0.154 0.007 0.005 
       
Percentage Outsiders -0.7236* -0.7213* -0.2691 -0.0145 -0.8455** -0.7251* 
 0.077 0.078 0.681 0.982 0.039 0.074 
       
Board Size 0.1418*** 0.1406*** 0.1508*** 0.1588*** 0.1243*** 0.1265*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
       
Firm Size 0.0795 0.0809 -0.0458 -0.0478 0.083 0.0869* 
 0.113 0.106 0.55 0.53 0.101 0.084 
       
Prior Performance 0.8734** 0.873** 2.088*** 2.1164*** 1.0164*** 0.9873*** 
 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 
       
Leverage 0.3785 0.3811 -0.0676 -0.0359 0.3609 0.3372 
 0.337 0.334 0.914 0.953 0.363 0.393 
              
       
R-Square 0.0552 0.0559 0.0682 0.0552 0.0727 0.0677 
       
# Observations 1,663 1,663 831 831 1,663 1,663 
              
Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3-3 Logistic Regression – CEO Turnover versus No CEO Turnover 
The dependent variables take the value 1 if the CEO is serving in his last full fiscal year, 
and zero otherwise.  Each dependent variable is regressed using a logit model on (1) a 
dummy variable, SIMILAR, (2) the interaction term (excess returnt-1*SIMILAR), and the 
various control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 SAL SAL EBC EBC TDC TDC 
       
Constant -2.5162*** -2.5224*** -2.9795*** -2.9778*** -2.4959*** -2.4972*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
SIMILAR 0.7185*** 0.7267*** 0.229*** 0.2136** 0.337*** 0.3377*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.000 
       
Excess Return (time t-1) * --- -0.2296* --- -0.4164** --- -0.05 
SIMILAR  0.065  0.016  0.688 
       
Excess Return (time t) 0.0085 0.008 -0.0505 -0.0488 -0.0173 -0.0176 
 0.843 0.854 0.481 0.499 0.722 0.718 
       
Excess Return (time t-1) -0.3459*** -0.2057*** -0.2586*** -0.5126*** -0.4009*** -0.3761*** 
 0.000 0.031 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Pay Gap 0.1553*** 0.155*** 0.3228*** 0.3232*** 0.3246*** 0.3241*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Duality -1.3119*** -1.3122*** -1.4367*** -1.4387*** -1.3049*** -1.3047*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Percentage Outsiders 0.4054*** 0.3994** 0.1581 0.1706 0.3726** 0.373** 
 0.010 0.011 0.496 0.463 0.017 0.017 
       
Board Size 0.0089 0.0093 0.009 0.0094 0.0201* 0.0201* 
 0.424 0.405 0.552 0.538 0.068 0.068 
       
Firm Size 0.0362* 0.0361* 0.0778*** 0.0768*** 0.0173 0.0174 
 0.071 0.072 0.005 0.006 0.386 0.382 
       
Leverage 0.1556 0.1531 0.2318 0.2383 0.1551 0.1547 
 0.332 0.340 0.314 0.300 0.328 0.329 
              
       
Log-likelihood -4,881.36 -4,879.69 -2,552.94 -2,549.98 -4,959.08 -4,959.00 
       
Chi-square 843.65 (0.00) 846.99 (0.00) 407.65 (0.00) 413.57 (0.00) 771.10 (0.00) 771.26 (0.00) 
       
# Observations 14,569 14,569 8,853 8,853 14,596 14,596 
              
Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3-4 Compensation Changes after Promotion to CEO 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Compensation changes are calculated as the difference in 
compensation between after becoming CEO and prior to 
becoming CEO.  
     
Variables Mean Median St. Dev. # Obs. 
Compensation Change Following Internal Succession:    
($ thousands)     
    Current Compensation 356.14 208.21 1,142.79 1,315 
     
    Equity-Based Compensation 8.95 48.55 11,385.97 1,315 
     
    Total Compensation 768.90 473.32 11,729.30 1,315 
          
     
Panel B: Paired t-test 
To compare compensation changes between two groups: 
“Homogeneous” and “Heterogeneous”. 
 
  # Obs. SAL # Obs. EBC # Obs. TDC 
       
Homogeneous 657 464.59 573 337.50 657 1,424.85 
       
       
Heterogeneous 658 247.86 742 -244.77 658 113.95 
       
       
Difference  216.73***  582.27  1310.9** 
       
 t-stat. 3.45  0.92  2.03 
       
 p-value 0.000  0.358  0.043 
              
       
Note: *** & ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% & 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-5 Robustness Test – Market Indices 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median St. Dev. # Obs. 
     
Excess Returns (at year t)     
    S&P 500 0.0617 0.0181 0.6328 14,843 
     
    CRSP Value-weighted 0.0548 0.0122 0.6335 14,843 
     
    CRSP Equal-weighted 0.0569 0.0116 0.6337 14,843 
     
Excess Returns (at year t-1)     
    S&P 500 0.0814 0.0272 0.6379 14,843 
     
    CRSP Value-weighted 0.0743 0.0219 0.6387 14,843 
     
    CRSP Equal-weighted 0.0775 0.0221 0.6391 14,843 
          
     
Panel B: Two Sample t-test 
  Mean St. Dev.     Mean St. Dev. 
Excess Returns (at year t)      
    S&P 500 0.0617 0.6328      S&P 500 0.0617 0.6328 
       
    CRSP Value-weighted 0.0548 0.6335      CRSP Equal-weighted 0.0569 0.6337 
       
    Difference 0.0069       Difference 0.0048  
       
    p-value 0.347       p-value 0.509  
       
    t-statistics 0.9404       t-statistics 0.6607  
       
Excess Returns (at year t-1)      
    S&P 500 0.0814 0.6379      S&P 500 0.0814 0.6379 
       
    CRSP Value-weighted 0.0743 0.6387      CRSP Equal-weighted 0.0775 0.6391 
       
    Difference 0.0071       Difference 0.0039  
       
    p-value 0.339       p-value 0.600  
       
    t-statistics 0.9567       t-statistics 0.5309  
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Panel C: Correlation 
  Correlation 
  
Excess Returns (at year t)  
    SP 500 ~ CRSP Value-weighted 0.9999 
  
    SP 500 ~ CRSP Equal-weighted 0.9992 
  
Excess Returns (at year t-1)  
    SP 500 ~ CRSP Value-weighted 0.9999 
  
    SP 500 ~ CRSP Equal-weighted 0.9991 
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Table 3-6 Robustness Test – Probit Regression 
Panel A: Internal/External Replacement 
 SAL SAL EBC EBC TDC TDC 
       
Constant 0.3784 0.2842 0.704*** 0.219 0.8304*** 0.1838 
 0.125 0.187 0.004 0.305 0.000 0.396 
       
Heterogeneity Index -0.2305 --- -0.9425*** --- -1.6805*** --- 
 0.720  0.000  0.000  
       
SIMILAR --- 0.088 --- 0.2879*** --- 0.2599*** 
  0.229  0.000  0.000 
       
Pay Gap -0.1331*** -0.1301*** -0.1166*** -0.1226*** -0.1092*** -0.1226*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
       
Duality -0.2167*** -0.2202*** -0.183** -0.2033*** -0.2013*** -0.2089*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.021 0.006 0.006 0.004 
       
Percentage Outsiders -0.3845* -0.3837* -0.3722 -0.3398 -0.4308* -0.3596 
 0.092 0.093 0.138 0.138 0.061 0.116 
       
Board Size 0.0748*** 0.0742*** 0.0772*** 0.0747*** 0.0699*** 0.0722*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Firm Size 0.0454 0.0465* 0.0369 0.0331 0.0473* 0.0483* 
 0.103 0.095 0.229 0.239 0.092 0.085 
       
Prior Performance 0.5396*** 0.5386*** 0.5708*** 0.5539*** 0.5816*** 0.5688*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
       
Leverage 0.2371 0.2369 0.2773 0.2727 0.2088 0.2167 
 0.283 0.283 0.249 0.218 0.347 0.328 
              
       
R-Square 0.055 0.0558 0.0795 0.0643 0.0697 0.0626 
       
# Observations 1,663 1,663 831 831 1,663 1,663 
              
Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.  
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Panel B: Turnover/No Turnover 
 SAL SAL EBC EBC TDC TDC 
       
Constant -1.4092*** -1.3398*** -1.64*** -1.6349*** -1.3784*** -1.3797*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
SIMILAR 0.3818*** 0.371*** 0.1222*** 0.1106** 0.166*** 0.1672*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.000 
       
Excess Return (time t-1) * --- -0.1322** --- -0.2096** --- -0.0343 
SIMILAR  0.032  0.013  0.579 
       
Excess Return (time t) 0.0058 0.0052 -0.0289 -0.0289 -0.0058 -0.0059 
 0.798 0.823 0.441 0.443 0.819 0.814 
       
Excess Return (time t-1) -0.1671*** -0.084 -0.1191*** -0.2481*** -0.1935*** -0.1769*** 
 0.000 0.122 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Pay Gap 0.0745*** -0.0071 0.1637*** 0.1636*** 0.1486*** 0.1483*** 
 0.000 0.770 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Duality -0.6954*** -0.6916*** -0.7318*** -0.7343*** -0.6886*** -0.6885*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Percentage Outsiders 0.2032** 0.2179*** 0.0732 0.0796 0.183** 0.1832** 
 0.016 0.009 0.544 0.509 0.028 0.028 
       
Board Size 0.0047 0.005 0.0045 0.0048 0.0101* 0.0101* 
 0.431 0.399 0.571 0.549 0.088 0.089 
       
Firm Size 0.0178* 0.0183* 0.0372*** 0.0366** 0.0098 0.0099 
 0.093 0.084 0.010 0.011 0.353 0.347 
       
Leverage 0.0975 0.1098 0.1286 0.1301 0.0968 0.0967 
 0.255 0.199 0.283 0.278 0.254 0.255 
              
       
R-Square 0.079 0.0776 0.0727 0.0738 0.0704 0.0704 
       
# Observations 14,569 14,569 8,853 8,853 14,596 14,596 
              
Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION 
 
With a sample of 347 S&P 500 firms, I find that firm governance in general improves 
after being added to the index.  Using a one-sample proportions test, I find that all mechanisms 
(except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit statistically significant 
improvements.  I also find that the market reacts positively to governance improvements.  In 
addition, improvements in governance are positively related to operating performance 
improvement. 
Using a novel measure of the competitiveness within the internal labor market, I find that 
the probability of an internal replacement is higher in a more competitive internal labor market.  
In addition, the increase in compensation is positively related to the competitiveness of the 
internal labor market.  Both results provide some support for tournament theory.  The negative 
relation between prior performance and probability of a turnover is also found.  In addition, this 
negative performance-turnover relationship is magnified by a more competitive internal labor 
market.  
 
 
